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OF THE KIND OF CASE 
lhis case involves a Writ of Review which is being tal<en 
trun, '-' deon1al ot a Motion for Review by the Industrial Commission 
dr h ing out of an industrial accident where the Industrial Com-
mission denied approval of a Compensation Agreement stipulated to 
by all of the parties to the claim. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Industrial Commission on March 8, 1983 denied approval 
of the parties' Compensation Agreement of December 7, 1982 which 
resolved between them complex questions of Second Injury Fund 
liability and reimbursement rights. The Petition for a Writ of 
Review dated April 7, 1983 of the Denial of a Motion for Review 
by the Industrial Commission was timely filed pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, §35-1-83 (1953, as amended), and Rule 72 
ot the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, inter alia. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Employee seel<s reversal of the final administrative 
decision of the Industrial Commission with a decision holding 
that the parties' Compensation Agreement is a legally enforceable 
contract between them. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 17, 1979 an Administrative Law Judge entered an 
urder awarding permanent partial impairment benefits to the 
lmployee based upon the findings of a Medical Panel Report find-
ing that he had experienced a 75% whole body impairment with 
Sb.2Si due to an industrial accident and 18.75% due to conditions 
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which pre-existed the :iccident. Record, p. L:u3. ALlhOUf',h th-
Administrative Law Judge ordered the insurance Cdrr ier for th, 
Employer to pay for its port ion of th<= rrr.enl, he did nor 
award any additional benefits to the Employee from the 
Injury Fund for that portion of the 
the industrial injury. Record p. 
impairment 
204. The 
which pre-existed 
insurance carrier 
filed a Motion for Review which was denied by the Commission. 
Record, pp. 206-7. No appeal from the denial was made. 
On September 30, 1982 the Employee filed a new Application 
for hearing claiming permanent total disability benefits. Rec-
ord, p. 210. Subsequently, on December 7, 1982, the Employee, 
the insurance carrier for the Employer and the Second Injury Fund 
all through legal counsel and notwithstanding the prior Order 
of the Commission -- entered into a Compensation Agreement where-
by the Secona Injury Fund agreed to pay the Employee 18. of 
the whole body permanent partial impairment and, further, agreed 
to reimburse the insurance carrier for 15/o of the medical ex-
penses and temporary total disability compensation it paid to the 
Employee as a result of the ind us trial injury. Record, PP· 
223-25. 
On January 4, 1983, legal counsel for the Commission de-
clined to approve the Compensation Agreement which resulted in ° 
Motion for Review and Request for Oral Argument dated January 6, 
1983 being filed with the Commission on January 10, 1983. Rec-
ord, pp. 220-22. 
On March 8, the Commission deniea the for Rev1e 0 
on the grounds of res judicata, with one Commissioner 
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on the bas is that aenial of the Employee's request for oral 
argument constituted a denial of due process. Record, p. 226-27. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the Indus-
trial Commission may prevent the execution of a Compensation 
Agreement stipulated to by all of the parties on the exclusive 
basis that the underlying claim upon which the agreement is based 
could if brought to a hearing and an appropriate objection 
raised by one of the defending parties 
trine of res judicata. 
be barred by the doc-
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY 
INVOKING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
IN REJECTING THE COMPENSATION ACREEMENT 
STIPULATED TO BY ALL PARTlES TO THE CLAIM 
In 1966 the United States Supreme Court held that " when 
an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and re-
solves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the 
parties have haa an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts 
have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." 
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 
421-22 (1966). However, this doctrine should not be transferred 
in every respe.ct to administrative procedures. See, e. g_., 
Oregon City, Etc. v. Oregon City Ed. Ass'n., 584 P.2d 303, 308 
(CJre. 1978). The Supreme Court of Oregon in that case suggests 
that the doctrine of res judicata may require greater flexibility 
in an administrative law forum. In the present case there are 
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several reasons why the Industrial Commission's actions ar, 
reversible. 
First, the doctrine of res judicata is an affirmdtive de-
fense which is inapplicable to any proceeding unless the party 
against whom action is initiated chooses to raise it; in essence, 
if it is not raised, it is waived. Utah Rules of Civil ProcedurE 
8(c). See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c). In the present 
case, the two Defendants chose not to raise it and, in addition, 
voluntarily entered into a stipulated Compensation Agreement with 
the Plaintiff to pay certain compensation to him notwithstanding 
that doctrine. The Industrial Commission lacks standing to raise 
the doctrine in this case since (1) it is not a party to the 
claim; (2) the claim has been informally resolved by all of the 
parties to the claim; and (3) the parties who had standing to 
raise it have chosen not to do so, and have, in ef feet, waiveci 
it. 
Second, in a recent decision of this Court, Pacheco v. 
Industrial Commission, No. 18896, issued on July 18, 1983, where 
this Court held that Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-78 (1981) does 
not require that interest be included by the Commission in all 
settlements, stated that "[U]nlil<e an award, a settlement in-
valves no factual determination by the Commission of liability or 
the amount of damages." (Emphasis added.) The Commission, 
therefore, clearly erred when it voided the Compensation Agree-
ment because the doctrine of res judicata necessarily involves Jr 
analysis of the question of liability which such inuqiry tht 
Commission is precluded from examining in a situation 1>here all 
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ot the parties have agreed to settle their differences. The 
doctrine of res judicata simply does not apply because the Comp-
Agreement does not require relitigation of any previous-
Ly litigated claim. 
Ano third, the Employee is merely seel<ing that which the 
Utah Legislature guaranteed to him in enacting Utah Code Annot-
ated (1981), namely, the Second Injury Fund beneficient 
concept. See, e. g_., Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 
61CJ P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980). In addition, in denying the 
Compensation Agreement, the Commission is also ignoring the 
legislative intent of that section by not giving the Employer the 
benefit he bargained for when the Employee was hired, i.e., 
limiting the Employer's liability to the damages sustained by an 
employee in an industrial accident. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Employee respectfully requests that the 
final adrnrninistrative decision of the Industrial Commission be 
reversed as capricious, arbitrary and contrary to law, and that 
the parties be permitited to resolve their differences along the 
lines agreed to in the stipulated Compensation Agreement of 
December 7, 1982. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 
I 
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